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INTRODUCTION
Money, we make it
Fore we see it you take it
Oh, make you wanna holler
The way they do my life
Make me wanna holler
The way they do my life
This ain't livin'
This ain't livin'
No, no baby, this ain't livin'
No, no, no1
Called a “protest anthem” for urban America, Inner City Blues, the final single from
R&B artist Marvin Gaye’s award-wining album What’s Going On, documents American
urban life by detailing the systemic barriers to economic independence and social equality
that plagued urban residents and the impact of these barriers on their daily lives. The song
(and album) were released in 1971 as Gaye’s journalistic exploration of the povertyinduced challenges and frustrations of urban life. Almost fifty years later, unfortunately,
not much has changed. This is because the operation of law in urban communities
historically not been designed to work for the benefit of poor urban residents but,
instead, for the benefit of other interests, such as private developers and business
interests. Why? Because urban residents are frequently viewed as the “problem”
of the urban core. America has attempted to “fix the problems” of its cities since cities
first began appearing on the American landscape a couple of hundred years before the
release of What’s Going On.
Rightly or wrongly, any list of urban problems will typically include challenges
such as traffic congestion, crime, gang violence, underperforming public schools, and high
rates of poverty. State and local governments have implemented an assortment of
programs, including development tax incentives such as tax increment financing, to cure
these problems.2 The majority of these initiatives, however, rarely are designed to meet the
actual challenges endured by poor urban residents.3 Instead, these programs focus on
creating enticements to lure a new “type” of urban resident—one who is not poor. 4 In other
words, the “fixes” are designed to displace poor black urban residents instead of engaging
directly with the source of the problems.5 As such, proposed fixes have been largely
mismatched to the problems in the urban core. 6 For example, disparities in educational
opportunities, limited access to quality affordable housing and healthcare, high
unemployment rates, and the biased execution of policing practices are urban realities that
MARVIN GAYE, Inner City Blues (Make Me Wanna Holler), on WHAT’S GOING ON? (Motown Records
1971).
2 See Audrey McFarlane, Redevelopment and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 22 J. L. & POL.
33 (2006).
3 Id. at 45.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Interview by Kenneth Clark of James Baldwin (1963) (available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8Abhj17kYU) (describing urban renewal programs as “Negro
removal”).
6 Id. at 45.
1
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cannot be cured by the construction of new highways, sports stadiums, luxury high-rise
apartments and condos, or the opening of craft breweries.7 This ongoing mismatch of
strategy to “perceived problem” calls for reimagining the application of law in the urban
core to address the urgency of poverty.
The origins of the mismatch lie in the industrialization and urbanization of
America. During WWI, African American migrants began moving from the
oppressive Jim Crow laws in the South to the rapidly industrializing cities in the
North and other parts of the country for jobs and some sense of personal safety,
dramatically changing the demographics of their destination cities. 8 In many
instances these migrants traded the formal segregationist laws of the South for
informal, but, in many ways equally destructive discriminatory practices in other
areas of the country. Given the limited opportunities for African Americans to
build and accumulate wealth in the South, many of the migrants arriving in these
other states were quite poor. 9 Even those with the financial means to move were
confined to these urban spaces by discriminatory practices such as racial covenants
and redlining. 10 As a result, poverty and urbanized life became racialized
concepts—equating urban life with African American culture and poverty. 11 This
notion became compounded as poor African Americans were displaced from their
neighborhoods and concentrated into high rise public housing projects to
accommodate urban renewal projects 12 As such, African Americans became the
urban “problem” to be fixed and many approaches to the operation of law in the
urban core are inappropriately designed around this flawed notion and, as a result,
fail. 13
The urban core, of course, has never only been inhabited by African Americans.
The urban core has and continues to be home for diverse communities, including many
low-income whites and immigrants.14 The growth of immigrant communities in the urban
core has reinforced the perception that the urban core is a place defined by poor people of
color. When the problems of the urban core became synonymous with the characteristics
of the poor people living in the urban core, displacement of urban residents through
redevelopment became a strategy for curing “urban blight.”15 To effectuate lasting social
change in the urban core, the role of law must address the causes of the urban
problems—instead of interacting with poor urban residents as if they are the
problem. This essay offers a non-litigation alternative for disrupting the practice of
mismatched urban development policies while making meaningful social change in the
See generally id.
See, e.g., THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT 23–24, 33–34 (2005) The date range for the Great Migration is typically reported as from 19101970. However, that date range has been divided into two segments: 1910-1930 and 1940-1970.
9 Id. at 24.
10 See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
11 Id. at 56.
12 Id. at 55–56.
13 Id. at 56.
14 See Faye Hipsman & Doris Meissner, Immigration in the United States: New Economic, Social, Political
Landscapes with Legislative Reform on the Horizon, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-united-states-new-economic-social-politicallandscapes-legislative-reform.
7
8
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urban core and throughout a metropolitan region: impact transaction through the relational
contracts of collective impact initiatives.
While urban communities each have their own unique geographic footprint, there
are certain common challenges that poor urban residents face as a consequence of systemic
race and class discrimination in areas such as affordable housing, healthcare, the
application of criminal justice, access to fair lending practices, and equitably resourced
public education. Legal recourse to these forms of systemic injustice typically is addressed
through impact litigation.16 Impact litigation is a powerful legal tool traditionally
associated with public interest or social change lawyering in the pursuit of large scale social
change through class action law suits.17 These law suits have been brought to bar housing
discrimination, segregation in public schools, discrimination in hiring, and myriad other
discriminatory practices. While these law suits brought significant victories that secured
important rights though the creation of new laws, the suits did not eradicate the
discriminatory behavior in actual practice. For example, despite the Supreme Court’s
decision to desegregate public schools, school segregation remains a significant challenge
for the majority of students in America’s public schools. 18 Thus, reexamination of the
application of law in the urban core is critical, and transactional law is an effective lens for
this reexamination.
Transactional law is centered on value creation, and transactional practice seeks to
create value for all of the parties to a transaction.19 It does this by being a forward-looking
practice designed to effectuate parties’ common goals while simultaneously identifying
and accounting for preventative mechanisms to prevent disharmony among the parties.20
Unlike impact litigation, impact transaction is not the pursuit of social change through
judicial adjudication.21 Instead, impact transaction is “a transactional, non-litigation
strategy for social change”22—a social change strategy based on voluntary actions and
agreements among parties interested in pursuing large-scale social change.23 Impact
litigation successes have occurred through a range of methodologies and strategies.24 Like
impact litigation, impact transaction can materialize through different methodologies.25
Collective impact is an impact transaction strategy.26
Collective impact is an emerging framework for large-scale social change.27 As a
“commitment of a group of important actors from different sectors to a common agenda
for solving a specific social problem,”28 collective impact is not just a new term “for
collaboration, but [it] represents a fundamentally different, more disciplined, and higherSee, e.g., ALAN CHEN & SCOTT CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 624 (2012).
17 See generally id.
18 See infra notes 32 – 36 and accompanying text.
19 ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERING PRACTICE 4
(2013).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 5.
22 Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact
Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 623 (2016).
23 See Id.
24 Id. at 625.
25 Id. at 628.
26 Id. at 633.
27 Id.
28 John Kania et al., Essential Mindset Shifts for Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 2, 2
(2014).
16
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performing approach to achieving large-scale social impact.”29 Reflective of transactional
practice, collective impact seeks to create value for all of the various parties involved in a
given initiative using means that do not involve litigation, but a social action deal-making
strategy. It is a more engaged method of collaboration with its defining features being “a
centralized infrastructure, a dedicated staff, and a structured process”30 but with no formal
contracting process. Much of the value generated through transaction, however, is through
contract. While entities may be parties to contracts, people operate entities and their
relationships with others drive deals and other transactions. There’s a name for that:
relational contract theory. This essay presents collective impact initiatives as relational
contracts and explains why the practice of collective impact needs a written form
agreement that reflects relational contract principles to enhance the collective impact
framework and facilitate impact transaction to address urban poverty.
I.

Exploring Impact Transaction as a Tool for Large-Scale Social Change

Many lawyers dedicate their careers to using the rule of law to secure systemic
relief for subordinated and marginalized individuals and communities. Impact transaction
emerges from this tradition, as an additional strategic tool for the social advocacy toolbox
– presented here as a framework for changing interrupting the cycle of urban poverty.
Impact litigation is the legal tool traditionally associated with public interest or
social change lawyering seeking large scale social change in areas such as housing, public
education, and health care. Impact litigation is “[p]lanning, preparing, and filing or
defending law suits focused on changing laws or the rights of specific groups of people.”31
Even if only one individual is involved in the litigation, impact litigation is judicial
adjudication of cases that have the potential to impact conditions broadly for many
similarly-situated people or to highlight a particular issue. To pursue impact litigation,
advocates employ legal strategies to vindicate rights and address injustice through judicial
opinion, while, in turn, hoping that such judicial opinions would promote more expansive
legal and social changes through legislative action. Impact transaction is not offered as a
replacement of impact litigation as a tool for social change, but as a complementary
strategy. Like impact litigation, impact transaction is a legal strategy for social change.
Impact transaction, however, is not a strategy seeking a judicial remedy. Courts facilitate
impact litigation, whereas impact transaction is facilitated by voluntary acts among parties
seeking to achieve a social outcome through transactional means, such as an agreement.
While this essay does not purport to replace impact litigation as a strategy for social
change, it does assert that there are two scenarios where transaction is the preferred
approach to problem-solving. First, where impact litigation has pushed an issue as far is it
can go through the judicial system, but without producing a framework for implementing
the social change sought. For example, one of the most renowned instances of a successful
impact litigation strategies is the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People’s (NAACP) campaign to abolish segregation in public education by bringing Brown

Fay Hanleybrown et al., Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work, Stan. Soc. Innovation
Rev, 1, 2 (2012).
30 John Kania & Mark Kramer, Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 36, 38 (2011).
29

31Litigation:

Impact, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interestlaw/public-interest-work-types/impact-litigation/ (last visited March 14, 2019).
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v. Board of Education.32 Brown was decided in 1954 and despite its calling for the
desegregation of America’s public schools, the majority of students in our public school
system today attend segregated schools in 2019.33 This is because the Court’s decision left
the implementation of desegregation to the states, and many, if not the majority of states
with segregated public school systems failed to implement any meaningful strategies for
desegregation.34 Thus, a judicial win, while crucially important, does not always guarantee
an actual sustainable social change outcome.35 Impact transaction is an alternative to
impact litigation as a tool for large-scale social change where a social justice outcome is
predicated upon an infrastructure for implementation that cannot be achieved by a judicial
decision, but may be achieved through a transactional strategy, such as agreement through
relational contract.36
The second scenario occurs where impact litigation is ill-equipped, as a practical
matter, to achieve social change because of its focus on securing individual rights. Impact
litigation pursues large-scale social change through class action law suits, however, the
effects of the law suit are not limited to the members of the class. For example, one of the
most recent examples of an impact litigation case, Obergefell v. Hodges, legalized same
sex marriage throughout the United States for all citizens—not just those participating in
the lawsuit.37 Unlike impact litigation, impact transaction is not triggered by infringement
on an individual’s rights or the commission of an actionable harm. Impact transaction is a
strategy to address a social ill where the eradication of that ill is not intended to produce
new legal rights for individuals that fit a class but, instead, systemic change. However,
again, this essay does not question the import of impact litigation. Instead, it offers impact
transaction as a complementary non-litigation strategy for pursuing social change in the
urban core.
Social change advocates understand that there is a distinction between “equality”
and “equity.”38 Equality ensures that everyone can participate in the same process and that
the process, itself, does not bar certain groups of people from participation.39 Equity,
however, understands that everyone needs access to the same opportunities while
recognizing that “access” is a dynamic concept that must change in accordance with
individual circumstances and needs.40 Impact litigation is designed to pursue equality,
impact transaction, on the other hand is designed to promote equity. Both, of course, are
important strategies for social change through legal reform. Conceptually, these two
strategies share the same goal of effectuating large-scale social change. The question
explored in this essay is how to do that through written agreement, and, more specifically,
whether relational contract theory can inform the construction of a framework for
collective impact agreements to facilitate impact transaction. In addition to outlining the
32See

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., Kristina Rizga, A Witness to the Desegregation-and Resegregation- of America’s Schools,
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/on-teaching-rebeccapalacios/559322/ (discussing segregation in Corpus Christie schools).
34 See, e.g., Sarah Garland, Was ‘Brown v. Board’ a Failure?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/was-brown-v-board-a-failure/265939/.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 See 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
38 See Vu Le, Why Equality Is Actively Harmful to Equity, NONPROFIT AF (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://nonprofitaf.com/2015/11/why-equality-is-actively-harmful-to-equity/.
39 Id.
40 See id.
33
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collective impact framework, the next section presents examples of current collective
impact initiatives and explains their potential for impact transaction.
II.

The Collective Impact Infrastructure and Framework

Originating in the philanthropic community, the collective impact framework holds
potential for promoting and sustaining impact transaction. Collective impact initiatives run
the gamut of transactional activities across the globe41, including affordable housing
development, economic development and workforce development, K-12 education, and
health and nutrition.42 For example, the Opportunity Chicago collective impact initiative
organized around the common agenda of helping public housing residents find, train for,
and obtain quality jobs.43 The Road Map Project collective impact initiative works to close
the K-12 achievement gap in Seattle, Washington.44 And, the Fresno Food Security
Network collective impact initiative is focused on eliminating food insecurity.45 These
three collective impact initiatives work to improve the conditions of affordable housing,
equity in public education, and community health outcome through nutrition through nonlitigation, transactional collaborative arrangements —all examples of systemic change
through impact transaction. The success of each of these initiatives is linked to the
participants’ incorporation of and adherence to the collective impact structure outlined
below.
The collective impact framework is built around the following five hallmarks: (1)
a common agenda; (2) shared measurement; (3) mutually reinforcing activities; (4)
continuous communication among the parties; (5) and the implementation of backbone
support organizations.46 First, fundamental to the framework, all parties to collective
impact initiatives must agree on a common agenda that reflects “a common understanding
of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed upon actions.”47 The
desired outcome of the common agenda is what brings the parties to the collective impact
in the first place.48 Second, the parties must agree to a methodology of shared measurement
for data collection that provides a framework for measuring and reporting the initiative’s
successes and failures, while acting as a check to keep the individual efforts of each
member of the initiative aligned with the common agenda.49 Third, each party must
contribute distinct, but mutually reinforcing, activities to advance the initiative and avoid

In addition to the United States, collective impact initiatives are ongoing in Canada and Australia.
For Canada see Collective Impact, TAMARACK INST., http://www.tamarackcommunity.ca/collectiveimpact
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). For Australia see Collective Impact, SOC. OUTCOMES,
https://socialoutcomes.com.au/toolkit/collective-impact/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
42 See generally Initiative Directory, COLLECTIVE IMPACT F.,
https://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/initiatives (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
43 See generally FSG, COLLECTIVE IMPACT CASE STUDY: OPPORTUNITY CHICAGO (2012) (available at
https://www.fsg.org/publications/opportunity-chicago).
44 About the Road Map Project, ROAD MAP PROJECT, https://roadmapproject.org/about-the-road-mapproject/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
45 See generally GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOOD TO SHARE
AS A HEALTHY COMMUNITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASE STUDY (2018) (available at
http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/20180305-FoodToShare-Case-Study.pdf).
46 See Kania et. al, supra note 28, at 2.
47 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 39.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 40.
41
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duplication of the services contributed to the collective impact.50 Fourth, members of
collective impact initiatives must participate in ongoing communication systems, which
may include the creation of a common vocabulary and other mechanisms to ensure that all
of the parties are continuously working towards the common agenda.51 Continuous
communication reinforces levels of trust among the participants, which is essential to the
initiative’s success.52 Lastly, and arguably, most essentially, collective impact initiatives
are managed by backbone agencies that are supposed to ensure the other four hallmarks
are being advanced within a collective impact initiative.53 Backbone agencies are the
project managers who manage the daily functions of their initiatives by working with a
collective impact network to “build consensus around a common goal, agree on how
progress will be measured, and coordinate activities to maximize results.”54 Backbone
agencies do not directly provide any program-related services to a collective impact
network,55 but, instead, focus “on the relationships between organizations and the progress
toward shared objectives”56 by coordinating the activities of the other stakeholders in the
collective impact network.57 The success of collective impact initiatives is linked to the
effectiveness of the backbone agency, and ineffective backbone support is the number one
reason collective impact initiatives fail.58
It is not only the structured framework that distinguishes collective impact from
other collaborative processes. Two other unique characteristics of collective impact
initiatives are (i)the diverse range of parties in each collective impact networks, and (ii) the
expectation that each specific party is supposed to contribute a very distinct role.59
Collective impact rosters typically include one or more backbone agencies; one or more
funders to provide technical or financial support; a collective impact consultant; and an
assortment of organizational members.60 A collective impact initiative may consist of
organizational members such as universities, nonprofit organizations, government and
public agencies, and business interests.61 Once the network roster is finalized, the members
are assigned to participate on steering committees and/or thematic working groups.62 Each
member is expected to provide “specialized assistance and resources specific to their
ability.”63 For example, “[b]usiness organizations are taking on strong roles [in collective
impact initiatives] . . . serving as a founding partner or backbone organization, to represent
See id.
See id.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 Kara Bixby, LINKEDIN (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/in/kara-bixby-19483288.
55 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 40.
56 See id.at 39.
57 See id. at 40.
58 See generally Shiloh Turner et al., Understanding the Value of Backbone Organizations in Collective
Impact: Part 3, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jul 19, 2012),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/understanding_the_value_of_backbone_organizations_in_collective_impact_3
.
59 Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 39.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 40.
62 Id.
63 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, RESERVE BANK COLLABORATION IN RURAL AREAS THROUGH
THE COLLECTIVE IMPACT MODEL (2015), https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/community_development/marketwise_community/2015/issue_1/pdf/v
ol5_issue1.pdf.
50
51
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the collective voice of the business community.”64 The collective impact framework also
sets expectations for the level of involvement from each participant by requiring
representatives of each network members to reflect organizational leadership, such as
university presidents, school district superintendents, and business, nonprofit, and
government officers. These requirements for diversity in organizational membership and
the commitment of organizational leaders should be viewed as indirect tools for enhancing
equity through collective impact by demonstrating a replicable model for inclusive design,
thinking, and planning in the public’s interest. These are the sorts of mechanisms that will
facilitate impact transaction.
So, why would collective impact initiatives work where other types of initiatives
have failed? Why aren’t collective impact initiatives another proposed mismatch for
addressing urban poverty? The answer is because collective impact’s influence is not
limited to the production of a new form of collaboration but also has generated several
paradigm shifts within the ideologies of philanthropic and social advocacy networks.65 The
most significant of these paradigm shifts is a more deliberative approach to identifying and
working to solve “adaptive” social problems instead of focusing on “technical” social
problems.66 Adaptive problems are complex problems with unknown or yet to be
discovered answers and, even if an answer is identified, for which no single entity “has the
resources or authority to bring about the necessary change.”67 Urban poverty, for example,
is an adaptive problem, because, despite decades of effort, there is no singular quantifiable
“fix” or “cure” for urban poverty.68 Urban poverty is not a social problem that can be
managed by a single organization. Technical social problems, in contrast, are well defined
and capable of being managed by a single organization.69 A shelter that provides temporary
housing to women and children escaping domestic violence demonstrates the management
of a technical problem, an important and fixed intervention in individual family crises. The
adaptive iteration of that example would focus on the systemic issues and social norms that
contribute to incidents of domestic violence. Technical social problems are singledimensional, causing them to be ill-suited for collective impact initiatives. Collective
impact is, instead, designed for multidimensional problem solving, where there is a breadth
of issues and the different perspectives on those issues held by a diverse group of
stakeholders.70 With this paradigm shift, collective impact initiatives avoid making isolated
impacts in social problems because “[b]y their very nature, individual nonprofit services
are fragmented and dispersed, with each organization typically serving a limited population
with specific interventions.”71
Collective Impact for Education and Workforce Development, ASS’N CHAMBER COM. EXECUTIVES,
http://www.acce.org/wiki/collective-impact-for-education-and-workforce-development/ (last visited Apr. 3,
2019) (discussing the increasing role of chambers of commerce as backbone support organizations in
collective impact initiatives).
65 Kania & Kamer, supra note 30, at 39.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Practitioner Insights: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM,
http://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/resources/practitioner-insights-federal-reserve-bank-san-francisco
69 See id.
70 See, e.g., Leonard J. Marcus et al., The Walk in the Woods: A Step-by-Step Method for Facilitating
Interest-Based Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 28 NEGOT. J. 337, 339–40 (2012).
71 See generally Kania et al., supra note 28. Michele Jolin et al., Needle-Moving Community
Collaboratives: A Promising Approach to Addressing America’s Biggest Challenges, BRIDGESPAN GROUP
1, 2 (2012), https://www.bridgespan.org/bridgespan/Images/articles/needle-moving-communitycollaboratives/needle-moving-community-collaboratives.pdf?ext=.pdf.
64
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Despite its potential, like with any emerging movement, collective impact has to
overcome challenges to its structure and implementation. In the context of confronting
urban poverty, there are two significant challenges to the sustained effectiveness of
collective impact as impact transaction: (i) the need for collective impact to develop a
deeper engagement with principles of equity and inclusivity, and (ii) the need for the
construction of a framework for working with written agreements.72
It is important for the collective impact framework to explicitly reflect principles
of equity so that an equity framework is in place at the founding of a collective impact
initiative.73 Fair critiques of the collective impact framework argue that collective impact
initiatives rely on a “grasstops”74 orientation instead of promoting “grassroots” organizing,
which leads to critiques that collective impact initiatives make decisions about the
communities in which they are attempting to promote large-social change without first
meaningfully engaging that community.75 That would be a waste that can be thoughtfully
avoided. Advocates of equity and inclusivity who see the potential of collective impact
have started the work of developing an equity lens for collective impact initiatives,76 as
well as formulating strategies for ensuring that equity principles are built into the collective
impact framework at the initial planning phases.77 Understanding “‘context’ . . . [as] a
broad concept best perceived comprehensively,” 78 relationists argue that “[c]ontract law,
which orders bargaining relationships and transactions, should always be tempered by the
facts of particular contexts.”79 “Context is the substance of the deal, the circumstances
under which the deal was made, the course of dealing between the parties, the industry(ies)
in which the parties operate, and ‘the asymmetrical information or power disparities’80
present in the transaction.” But, in collective impact agreements, context could and should
be broader. “The lack of acknowledgment of cultural, class, and racial factors in the
interpretation and enforcement of contracts—bias and discrimination issues aside—relates
partially to contract law’s egalitarian underpinnings.”81 Impact transaction can occur
through collective impact initiatives executed through written relational contracts that
reflect principles of equity.
The second significant challenge to the long-term success of collective impact is
the lack of any sort of formalized contracting process for collective impact agreements.
Members of collective impact initiatives “agree to agree,” while participating in numerous
See, e.g., Michael McAfee et al., Equity: The Soul of Collective Impact, POLICYLINK 1, 3,
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/Collective_Impact_10-21-15f_0.pdf.
73 See, e.g., Sarah Stachowiak & Lauren Gase, Does Collective Impact Really Make and Impact?, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/does_collective_impact_really_make_an_impact.
74 See Melody Barnes et al., Roundtable on Community Engagement and Collective Impact in Collective
Insights on Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 12, 14 (2014).
75 See id.
76 See generally Seeing Collective Impact Efforts with a Racial Justice Lens, INTERACTION INST. FOR SOC.
CHANGE (June 7, 2017), http://interactioninstitute.org/seeing-collective-impact-efforts-with-a-racialjustice-lens/.
77 See, e.g., Juan Sebastian Arias & Sherl Brady, 3 Steps for Advancing Equity through Collective Impact,
COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM (Apr. 15, 2015), http://collectiveimpactforum.org/blogs/11421/3-stepsadvancing-equity-through-collective-impact.
78 Id. at 662.
79 Id. at 662 (citing Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and Contracts as Context,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 561 (2010)).
80 Arias & Brady, supra note 77, at 662 (citing DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 79, at 557).
81 Id. at 658 (citing DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 79, at 569).
72
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planning processes to build trust and work toward a common agenda.82 The complexity of
attempting to solve adaptive problems through the efforts of multiple and distinct parties
necessitates a more formalized collective impact agreement to ensure that all parties’
expectations are memorialized, increasing the likelihood that those expectations will be
met.83 A typical bank finance transaction presents an interesting conceptual analog for
demonstrating the value of written agreements. For example, when a bank syndicate makes
a loan to a borrower, the relationship among the various banks and the borrower is governed
by a credit agreement or some other type of loan agreement. That credit agreement
documents each of the party’s obligations, including the total loan amount, the amount of
each individual bank’s participation in the loan, the conditions precedent to closing the
loan, the rate of interest applied to the loan, the loan term, affirmative covenants (things
the borrower must do to stay in compliance with the agreement), negative covenants (things
the borrower should not do while under the agreement), events of default (things the
borrower might do to default under the agreement), the various representations and
warranties that the borrower must make about its capacity to participate in and repay the
loan, the required steps the borrower must draw from the loan, and the obligations of each
of the lenders to participate in the loan. This transaction, and similar transactions, are
accomplished using a myriad of form agreements that have been proven for the type of
transaction and, ideally, tailored for the particular transaction.84 While loan agreements are
a markedly different type of transaction from collective impact initiatives, they operate
under a similar structure of relationship but without any form agreement frameworks.85
Loan agreements are shaped and governed by contract law. As explained below, collective
impact initiatives should be shaped and governed by relational contract theory because
collective impact agreements drafted using relational contract principles could be the
appropriate match for confronting poverty in the urban core as impact transaction.
III.

Impact Transaction in The Urban Core Through Collective Impact
Initiatives and Relational Contract Theory

This essay opened by explaining the mismatch between the challenges in the urban
core and the solutions typically proposed to address those challenges. Linking the
mismatch to historic practices of race and class discrimination, this essay promotes the idea
of private agreement as a means for creating large-scale social change in the urban core.
More specifically, this essay seeks to counter the mismatches by presenting the potential
of written relational collective impact agreements to address the urgency of poverty. In
other scholarship, I have discussed the value of voluntary agreement.86 Here, in particular,
the value of agreement between parties committed to social change can be striking when
compared to the social and economic gaps created by government failures in mismatched
responses to urban poverty. Transactional practice seeks value creation for all the parties
This essay argues for the value of a written agreement to effectuate collective impact initiatives. While
courts generally treat “agreements to agree” as unenforceable, there are a number of legal scholars who
have suggested this distinction between a contract and negotiations preceding contract formation is overly
formalistic and should be reconsidered. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict
Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 871 (2001) (citing Ian R. Macneil, A Primer of Contract Planning,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 627 (1975)).
83 Id.
84 Crowder, supra note 22, at 654.
85 Id. at 637.
86 See id.
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to a transaction,87 collective impact is the latest iteration of transactional advocacy in the
public interest.
Before collective impact initiatives, transactional efforts at social change occurred
through transactions such as memorandums of understanding (MOUs), the creation of
social enterprise structures, or by engaging in the most well-known space for transactions
for the public good, and community economic development (CED).88 While each of these
types of “public good transactions” assist underserved communities in the urban core, each
also has certain limitations that work against its ability to promote large-scale social change
through impact transaction.
Nonprofit organizations and public sector agencies regularly use MOUs to
memorialize their strategic partnerships.89 MOUs, however, are typically nonbinding
agreements that document the parties’ aspirational goals without identifying specific rights
and obligations of the parties or outcomes.90 Similarly, the majority of social enterprises
are generally either for-profit businesses that pursue “the methods and disciplines of
business and the power of the marketplace to advance their social, environmental and
human justice agendas”91 or nonprofit corporations undertaking revenue generating
business.92 The pursuit of social change through social enterprise is growing in popularity
in terms of both increasing numbers of social enterprise start-ups and consumers seeking
to support social enterprises with their dollars.93 While consistently making significant
interventions in their chosen social fields, as independent and unrelated entities, social
enterprises are ill-suited for promoting large-scale social change through collaborative
efforts as impact transaction. The social enterprise “movement” facilitates the formation
and operation of individual entities. Any collaboration among social enterprises is focused
on the growth of the industry through regulatory reform and other operational concerns,
not forming cross-sector partnerships focused on systemic social change.94 Lastly, CED is
both a type of legal practice and a social movement that has been deployed in underserved
communities for decades.95 CED projects originated to promote community-based
economic opportunity in underserved communities through the deployment of different
types of transactions, such as community benefits agreements (“CBAs”).96 CBAs are
private contracts between developers and community groups by which a community
(usually through a community association or nonprofit organization) agrees to support a
local development project in exchange for certain benefits that should meet the needs of
the local community, such as workforce development and local hiring preferences for

See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost Engineers (Aug. 1997).
Colorado Collaboration Award, Collaboration Toolkit: Creating an MOU, 2013,
http://anschutzfamilyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MOU-toolkit-MAIN.pdf.
89See Written Agreements, PROJECT FOR PUB. SPACES (Dec. 31, 2008), https://www.pps.org/article/ppppchapter4.
90 See, e.g., id.
91 Mark Jordhal, What Is a Social Enterprise?, BEAD FOR LIFE (Apr. 5, 2015),
http://www.beadforlife.org/blog/what-is-a-social-enterprise/ [[https://perma.cc/L4RU-A75S;]; see also
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013).
92Jordhal, supra note 91.
93 Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 257, 257 (2009).
94 Id. at 265.
95 Id. at 258.
96 Id. at 261.
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community residents.97 Despite many significant successes throughout the decades, the
suitability of CED, generally, and CBAs, specifically, as tools for the type of large-scale
social change contemplated by impact transaction, is unsettled. The reasons for this include
the ever-present question about the identity of the “community” to be involved in decisionmaking as well as the idea that CED theories may limit CED’s impact to local
neighborhood projects to the exclusion of the possibility of large-scale social change
collective impact initiatives, and impact transaction, are designed to promote.98
The benefits of these public good transactions are unquestioned by this essay. Like
MOUs, social enterprises, and CED transactions, collective impact is a public good
transaction, and impact transaction is not presented to eradicate the need for other public
good transactions (either those currently in existence or those waiting to be discovered).
This essay’s suggestion that these types of public good transactions do not directly advance
impact transaction (i.e. large-scale social change) is not an argument against their
effectiveness, but recognition that comprehensive large-scale social change in the urban
core through impact transaction may be best accomplished through the use of private
written collective impact agreements that are grounded in relational contract principles.
Where CED is inherently local, collective impact agreements can be regional in scope.99
Where the social enterprise movement is focused on the efforts of individual entities, as
explained later,100 collective impact agreements can be the umbrella under which multiple
entities work together to advance impact transaction. Where MOUs are an outdated
approach to contracting for the public good, collective impact agreements drafted using
relational contract theory can properly set the parties’ expectations for both performance
and nonperformance under the agreement.
There is inherent value in both contract and an informed process for contracting.
Parties enter contracts looking for predictability, risk allocation, and reliability,101 and
contracts bring order to transactions by creating frameworks for the parties to transact
through. Irrespective of discipline, most contracts exhibit five common elements: (1)
cooperation; (2) exchange; (3) mutual planning for the future; (4) potential sanctions; and
(5) social control and social manipulation.102 Contract law, however, is not static. While
the elements of most fundamental contract law principles have remained the same since
first articulated (think offer, acceptance, and consideration as the elements for formation
of a contract), individual concepts do evolve over time to reflect current industry practices,
regulatory schemes, legal developments, and new technologies (think of the evolution of
the concept of consideration as a necessity for formation, evolving from a significant
See, e.g., Sandy Gerber, Community Benefits Agreements: A Tool for More Equitable Development?,
FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 1, 2007), https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/communitydividend/community-benefits-agreements-a-tool-for-more-equitable-development.
98 See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic Development and the Case for
Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 144–45 (2004).
99 Focusing on “cradle to career” programing in urban schools in Cincinnati, suburbs in Ohio, and Northern
Kentucky, StrivePartnership is one of the first and most renowned regional collective impact initiatives.
See Collective Impact, STRIVETOGETHER, https://www.strivetogether.org/our-approach/collective-impact/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
100 See infra notes 106 – 119 and accompanying text discussing relational contract’s ability to consider both
“corporate and social” agendas as indicative of collective impact’s ability to have agreements with similar
scopes.
101Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 692 (2005).
102 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 808-09 (1974)
(arguing “status, social role, kinship” and other “internalizations” play a role in contract and discussing the
role of the social matrix in contract).
97
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concrete deliverable to the requirement of a “mere peppercorn”). In addition to evolving
contractual concepts, different types of contracts emerge to accommodate specific
industries and types of parties. For example, e-contracts accommodate virtual exchanges
between parties to contracts for new types of services such as shared rides and other
services stemming from the “gig economy.” New forms of contracting follow societal
trends and innovations. Given the increasing diversity of contracting needs, contract law
scholars consistently consider what new mechanisms will “accommodate [the] new world
of transactions.”103 Collective impact is a new type of transaction, and relational contract
theory is the contract law mechanism best suited to accommodate this new transaction.
The evolution of contract law as a discipline is separated into the development of
classical and modern contract law theories. Classical legal analysis holds that the definitive
contract is an isolated discrete exchange between strangers in a market where the parties
are able to “at minimal cost . . . allocate explicitly the risks that future contingencies may
cause one or the other to regret having entered into an executory agreement.”104 Modern
contract law, in contrast, holds that formation of a contract may be a dynamic, evolving
process, rather than a process located at a fixed moment in time.105 Relational contract
theory is, arguably, modern contract law’s most significant contribution to contract law
theory.106 Lacking a singular definition, relational contracts are typically described as
contracts where “the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement
to well-defined obligations”107 and where “[s]uch definitive obligations may be impractical
because of inability to identity uncertain future conditions or because of inability to
characterize complex adaptions adequately even when the contingencies themselves can
be identified in advance.”108 Another definition describes a relational contract as “[a]
legally enforceable written contract establishing a commercial partnership within a flexible
contractual framework based on social norms and jointly defined objectives, prioritizing a
relationship with continuous alignment of interests before the commercial transactions.”109
Relational contracts govern both the substance of the transaction (i.e. what is being
exchanged among the parties) as well as the frameworks for how those exchanges are to
occur over time. There are two main approaches to consider in the creation of a relational
contract: the substance of what is being exchanged (i.e. the goods and/or services being
exchanged) and the types of provisions and mechanisms included in the agreement to
govern the exchange. Hallmarks guiding how to approach drafting a relational contract (i.e.
the goals for the contract) include focus on the relationship, not just the deal to be
transacted; establishing partnerships instead of an arms-length relationships; embedding
social norms in the relationship; avoiding and mitigating risk by alignment of interests; and

Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, supra note 101, at 698.
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1089–90
(1981). This narrow conception of contract law led Grant Gilmore to write The Death of Contract in which
he argued that all contracts are individual and discrete interactions and that, as such, there was little value
in continuing to teach contract law as a doctrinal course in the law school curriculum because there was no
comprehensive theory of contract law to teach to students. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1st ed. 1974).
105 Id. at 1095–96.
106 See Richard Austen-Baker, A Relational Law of Contract?, 20 J. CONT. L. 125 (2004).
107 Goetz & Scott, supra note 104, at 1091.
108 Id.
109 David Frydlinger et al., Unpacking Relational Contracts: The Practitioner’s Go-To Guide for
Understanding Relational Contracts, U. OF TENN. C. OF BUS., at 5.
103
104
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creating fair and flexible framework in which to execute the relational contract.110
Hallmarks of types of provisions included in relational contracts include indefiniteness in
duration; informality; incompleteness;111 impreciseness with performance standards;
intentionality about identifying roles for social norms and social control; representation of
industry standards;112 and tolerance of gaps in risk allocation. Each of these hallmarks is
also a collective impact value,113 which further underscores the appropriateness of
relational contract theory to execute collective impact agreements. For the purposes of
contemplating use of collective impact agreements to counter urban poverty, this essay
focuses on three of the most significant common themes between the hallmarks of
relational contract theory and the collective impact framework: (i) the importance of the
relationship among the parties; (ii) the role of social norms and social capital; and (iii)
incompleteness of contact.
As relational contracts steer incomplete, long-term relationships,114 the importance
of the context of those relationships is supreme. Relational contract theory recognizes that
“relationships are not just person to person, but also organization to organization.”115 The
importance of the underlying relationships among the parties broadens the scope of the
traditional contract to include “the framework for the relationship—the forums, behaviors
and mechanisms within which interactions will occur.”116 The scope of relational contracts
exceeds beyond the goods or services being exchanged to include governing the
mechanisms in the relationships designed to “not only foster mutual trust, but also facilitate
the sharing of knowledge and information to generate innovation and value for the parties
to the relationship.”117 Considering this scope, it is not surprising that “[a] key goal of
relational contract is to create a continuous alignment of interests throughout the contract
term,”118 meaning that “the influential elements of relational contracting that assume
greater significance are co-operation and dependency.” 119
The construction industry is the paradigmatic example of relational contract
because construction contracts typically involve long-term projects with multiple parties,
such as property owners, general contractors, subcontractors, architects, and engineers.
These projects generally are completed in phases, with many projects remaining
incomplete until other phases are first completed. A fundamental principle in construction
is that the primary function of a construction contract “is not to predict or control all
contingencies that may arise in the future but to create a workable framework for managing
successful relationships.”120 In construction, relationships are paramount, and
Id. at 21.
See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 852, 862
(2000).
112 But see Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 662 (2010) (discussing the
importance of applying “loose standards [rather] than formalistic rules” to relational contracts).
113 See Kania et. al, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing the five hallmarks of collective impact).
114 Morten Hviid, Long Term Contracts and Relational Contracts, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 46, 58 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
115 Frydlinger et al., supra note 109, at 4.
116 Id.
117 Barbara Colledge, Relational Contracting – Creating Value Beyond the Project, 2 LEAN CONSTRUCTION
J. 30, 32 (2005).
118 Id. at 20.
119 “This greater connectivity between the various professions and stakeholders, greater partnership
working, greater sharing of knowledge and ideas or knowledge capital and greater capacity for creativity, to
identify creative, effective solutions is a feature of relational approaches.” Id. at 39.
120 Frydlinger et al., supra note 109, at 20.
110
111
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“[e]xperienced owners and contractors, and their seasoned lawyers, often observe that a
project’s success depends more on establishing and managing the relationships between
the participants than on the contracts they execute.”121 The concept of relationality is so
inherent in the construction industry that it is embedded in the industry’s standard form
documents, which are largely produced by industry trade associations.122 The construction
industry’s respect for and use of relational contracts is the right model for collective impact
practitioners,123 because relationships also drive collective impact agreements.124
To manage the scopes of the relationships among the parties to a transaction,
relational contracts incorporate rules for the development and operation of social norms. A
signature characteristic of rational contracts is the institution of social norms as an
enforcement mechanism.125 Relational contract theory is an ideal framework for collective
impact because relational contract theory allows for the creation of social norms to govern
both commercial and social transactions, and collective impact initiatives have both
commercial and social contexts.126 The construction industry standards discussed earlier
are an example of commercial implications of relational contract theory.127 The social
implications of relational contract theory manifest as both the real impact that relational
contracts can actually have on the ground in communities and the types of social norms
that may be memorialized in relational contracts to sustain the relationships among the
parties.128 Relational contracts can be a tool for community development working against
urban poverty where the “alignment of both the commercial and social corporate agendas
. . . is important in the creation of sustainable communities.”129 When employed in a public
interest context, relational contracts can strengthen the social capital of those suffering
from poverty in the urban core.130 “[S]social capital refers to connections among
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them.”131 “[P]arties [to relational contracts]. . . have learned to behave under two sets
of rules: a strict set of rules for legal enforcement and a more flexible set of rules for social
enforcement.”132 The notion of working together through agreement to continuously align
the interests of the multiple parties to a relational contract in the pursuit of a common
agenda completely mirrors the collective impact framework. For example, the
comprehensive planning processes discussed previously133 fosters the social norm of trust
and creates important decision-making mechanisms such as frameworks for dispute
Carl J. Circo, The Evolving Role of Relational Contract in Construction Law, 32 CONSTRUCTION L. 16,
16 (2012).
122 See id
123 See Colledge supra note 117, at 34.
124 See id. at 31.
125 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725–28 (2001).
126 See id.
127 The construction industry’s adoption of relational contract theory is an example of the commercial
application. See id. at 32.
128 See id. at 34.
129 Id.at 33.
130 “The adoption of relational contracting approaches can make a significant contribution to the
development of sustainable communities through the building of “social capital.” Id. at 31.
131 Colledge, supra note 117, at 34 (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000)).
132 Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
597, 615 (1990).
133 See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 102.
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resolution.134 Examples of other social norms for managing relational contracts include
communication; problem-solving; establishing and fostering “no-blame” culture; creating
mechanisms to foster “joint working” among the parties; establishing and being clear about
mutual objectives; and developing benchmarks for performance measurements and
monitoring for continuous improvements.135 These guiding principles are almost identical,
conceptually, to the five hallmarks of collective impact.136 Relational contract theory social
norms are developed and best implemented from the parties’ “dedication to the philosophy
of collective work, commitment to the common agenda, and willingness to leave … ego at
the door.”137 Members of collective impact networks are bound by a shared desire for largescale social change and an abiding trust in the collective impact process.138
Every contract is partially unplanned139 and incomplete. While relational contracts
are, by definition, incomplete, that “incompleteness” does not mean relational contracts are
substantively flawed.140 Incomplete contracts are “[l]ess-complete contracts that rely on
trust and reciprocity rather than control.”141 Parties enter incomplete contracts for
numerous strategic reasons. 142 Two of the most common of these are (i) potential high
transaction costs are difficult to estimate in light of an unknown or unpredictable future,
and (ii) asymmetric information between the parties that one or both parties is unwilling to

“The termination of relational contracts engenders closer scrutiny. The duty to adjust or renegotiate,
along with the norms of good faith and fair dealing, play more important roles, often non-legally induced.”.
DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 70, at 562 (2010) (citing Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of
Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 265, 317-19 (1999)) (discussing the norms of good faith and fair dealing in contract law).
135 See, e.g., JIM BERGMAN ET AL., UNPACKING RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE PRACTITIONER’S GO-TO
GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 5–6, 44 (2016). While relational contract is not a
new legal theory, it is an emerging field of interdisciplinary and international study as a business practice
with research and scholarship coming from non-law other types of academics, practicing attorneys, and
industry experts.
An Australian case study, FFG Enterprise, was recognized as one of the world’s best practice in relational
contracting and collaboration. The case study’s authors identified the following lessons for successful
relational contracting:
• A charter is a powerful tool
• The roadmap (unpacking relational contracts) already exists;
• Leadership is essential;
• Create a shared belief;
• Build trust;
• Culture is a key enabler;
• Contracts are a tool, not a weapon;
• Co-location is an operational multiplier; and
• Continues improvement is indeed continuous;
KATE VITASEK ET AL., THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY FFG ENTERPRISE: A JOURNEY FROM ANTAGONISM
TO HIGH PERFORMING RELATIONSHIP 2-5 (2018).
136 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 38.
137 Kim Fortunato, When and How To Engage the Private Sector in Collective Impact, COLLECTIVE IMPACT
(July 14, 2015 9:21 PM), http://collectiveimpactforum.org/blogs/9406/when-and-how-engage-privatesector-collective-impact.
138 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30.
139 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 731.
140 See Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 299-01
(2014).
141 See id. at 300.
142 See id. at 305–06.
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share.143
While “incompleteness” is imbedded in the definition of relational contract, the
label is also particularly true for collective impact initiatives. The counter to
“incompleteness” is planning. Typically, planning around a discrete contract involves
determining (1) the parties’ goals, (2) the costs associated with those goals, and (3) the
methods for achieving those goals, including timelines.144 “Parties to a relational contract
. . . are likely to view the exchange as an ongoing integration of behavior which will grow
and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future.”145 Planning is fundamental to the
execution of relational contracts. 146 There is a distinction, however, between performance
planning and risk planning.147 Performance planning contemplates what tasks each party
must perform, the timeline by when the parties must perform these tasks, and the
appropriate performance standards.148 Relational contract theory’s willingness to tolerate
risk is not synonymous with not planning for risk.149 Planning for risk allocation
contemplates the positions of each party and which is best situated to minimize or
withstand the risks in the transaction.150 In collective impact, planning dominates all other
activities, as ongoing negotiated brainstorming occurs among the parties about the
initiative.151 Collective impact is a relational phenomenon that requires expression in
written collective impact agreements to reach its full potential.152
The idea of a tailored written agreement is not alien to practitioners of relational
contract theory.153 The argument for a written collective impact agreement may seem in
opposition to the culture of trust that is fundamental to the core, formation, and
sustainability of collective impact initiatives.154 There are, however, methods for
approaching a collective impact contracting process that reflect the core values of
collective impact.155 As advocates of written agreements have noted, “using a formal
process at the start of the contracting process” can “ensure organizations and individuals
feel there has been a fair process for establishing the contract.”156 In addition, although
collective impact initiatives are built around a common agenda, it is important to note that
participants are also motivated by their own organizational self-interests and a written
See Scott, supra note 111, at 862-63.
See Allen Grossman et al., StriveTogether: Reinventing the Local Education Ecosystem, HARV. BUS.
SCH. 5, 5 (2014).
145 Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing,
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 281 (2006) (quoting Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and
Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (2000)).
146 “Relational contract theorists can win over adherents if contracts can be usefully mapped and ordered
based on their relational elements . . . .” Leib, supra note 112, at 661.
147 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 761. Planning an exit strategy from the transaction is equally important.
148 See id.
149 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 729.
150 See Scott, supra note 132, at 602.
151 See id., at 615.
152 See generally Kania & Kramer, supra note 30.
153 “Relational contract theorists can win over adherents if contracts can be usefully mapped and ordered
based on their relational elements[.]” See Leib, supra note 112, at 661. This “mapping” and “ordering” can
only occur in a written agreement.
154 See generally id. at 675-76 (“Most often, parties simply cannot allocate risks of their mutual endeavor
at the start of a relationship because so much is uncertain, and so much trust-building is necessary to get the
relationship off the ground. Indeed, the very incompleteness of the deal between the parties is central in
defining what counts as a relational contract[.]”).
155 See BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 14.
156 Id. at 20.
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agreement would, ideally, protect both the achievement of the common agenda as well as
the interests of each individual participant by preserving each participant’s preferences and
expectations. A written agreement would also memorialize the flexibility desired for
navigating these ongoing long-term relationships and the work required to address adaptive
social problems.157 Collective impact transactions need written form agreements to better
reflect the intent of each collective impact initiative and because the contract frameworks
will enhance implementation of collective impact methods.158
Another reason in support of written collective impact agreements is that the forms
of contract used to date for collective impact agreements are a collection of form types that
are ill-structured for maximizing collective impact outcomes and, thus, impact
transaction.159 Unlike with the construction industry, there are no standard form agreements
in collective impact.160 Most collective impact initiatives are papered with MOUs,
partnership agreements, or grant agreements. While document titles alone are far from
demonstrative of the substance of an agreement, there are significant reasons why each of
these types of documents is ill-suited for collective impact initiatives.
As previously explained,161 the majority of MOUs are nonbinding agreements.
Collective impact initiatives are best served by binding written agreements.162 This essay
does not make this suggestion lightly. While the organizational parties to collective impact
agreements can be easily identified, there are myriad intriguing foundational challenges to
resolve in order to widely implement these binding written agreements into collective
impact practice. These challenges include (i) drafting around the power differentials among
the organizational parties, (ii) accounting for appropriate critiques concerning the negative
consequences of formality on disenfranchised groups, and (iii) appropriate sanctions for
breach. In addition to these challenges, while this essay advocates for the use of private
agreement, it recognizes that many of the social ills awaiting large-scale social change
involve significant government interventions that will have to be considered (i.e. what is
the role of government in collective impact with either the individual organizational
members (e.g. as a grant provider or other type of partner) or as a barrier to systemic
change).163 An equally important question is how lawyers who work in any capacity on
collective impact initiatives can be better trained to assist with these projects—again, the
construction industry serves as important precedent here.164
Standard grant agreements are also problematic. Where collective impact
agreements are based on the initial grant agreement between the funder and the backbone
agency, there could be significant concerns about whether there is privity of contract
between the funder and the non-backbone participants who are party to the collective

See Davidson, supra note 145, at 289, 300.
Cf. id. at 296.
159 This essay does not present empirical evidence of this fact, but a quick Google search should satisfy any
readers’ curiosity about the assertion. See generally Steering Committee Governance Agreement,
COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM, https://collectiveimpactforum.org/resources/steering-committee-governanceagreement.
160 Cf. Scott, supra note 132, at 869.
161 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing MOUs as public good transactions).
162 See supra pp. 29-30 and notes 154–58.
163 See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 145, at 299-300.
164 See Circo, supra note 121, at 22.
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impact initiative.165 There would be questions about the existence of privity of contract
among the other organizational participants in the collective impact initiative.
Partnership agreements are another type of form agreement misapplied to collective
impact initiatives.166 While it is clear that collective impact participants view their
involvement in collective impact initiatives as nonbusiness but strategic partnerships, form
partnership agreements are an inappropriate form for collective impact initiatives. Unlike
MOUs and grant agreements, partnership agreements are not agreements for an exchange
of services, but memorialize the legal obligations of partners who want to work in concert
together in a for-profit venture purpose for their pecuniary gain.167 The partners’ ownership
interests, levels of liability, governance rights, and partnership agreements are governed by
the default rules in individual state statutes. Again, naming a document a “partnership
agreement” in the absence of any language that indicates that the parties want to form a
partnership, will not automatically create a legal partnership. However, how effective will
the collective impact model be for establishing replicable models for large-scale social
change if its foundations are built on the use of inappropriate and, thus, potentially
ineffective, documents?
In addition to accounting for the uniqueness of the collective impact infrastructure
framework in written agreement, there are two important drafting considerations that will
impact the drafting of collective impact agreements: (1) the number of parties to the
contract, and (2) the substance of the contract (what is being contracted for).168 Collective
impact agreements are service contracts, meaning agreements for the exchange of services
as opposed to the sale of goods.169 Collective impact agreements are multilateral (multiparty) service agreements among cross-sector participants with diverse skill sets that are
designed to affect a large-scale social change of an adaptive problem through synchronized
and phased service delivery coordinated through long-term ongoing planning.170 While
contracts for services are inherently more relational than contracts for the sale of goods,171
multilateral agreements do require special drafting considerations, such as establishing

See Davidson, supra note 145, at 292 (citing Clenega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1242
(Fed. Circ. 1998)).
166 But see BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 21.
167 In early writings, Ian Macneil emphasized that humans desire both “solidarity and reciprocity,” thus
instilling a tendency to prefer relational contracts because a relational contract (1) can entail elements of
discrete transactions enhancing independence and embodying choice; and (2) relational business dealings
are more valuable for immediate and long-term monetary and social success than most pure discrete
contracts with a stranger. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274 (1987) [hereinafter
Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology]. Further, Macneil focused on trade relationships and
trade partnerships as examples of “social solidarity” where individuals can have a heightened sense of trust
validated through “specialized reciprocity.” Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and
Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 569-70 (1986).) [herinafter Macneil, Exchange Revisited].). Macneil
focused on trading partnerships at very intricate and very low levels as examples of how humans have a
penchant for relational contracts that are “ubiquitous as long as those relations continue.” Macneil,
Relational Contract Theory as Sociology, supra note 167, at 284. Partnerships require engaging in “some
give and take of information—a give which constitutes a form of mutual planning.” Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, supra note 102, at 770.
168 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 758, 792.
169 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30.
170 See Crowder, supra note 22, at 623.
171 See id. at 694.
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privity of contract among the appropriate parties.172
Other drafting concerns include the most effective way to enforce relational
contracts173 – this would be true for collective impact agreements too. True to the
preventative nature of transactional practice and the collaborative nature of relational
contracts in general, and collective impact in particular, approaches to enforcement do not
have to focus on what occurs if a party breaches, but can, instead, focus on what parties
would need to avoid breaching.174 Drafters can accomplish this by creating innovative
default rules for the collaborative that are based on linkages between legal rules and
underlying social norms.175 Default rules are typically perceived as “gap fillers” for
incompleteness in a contract.176 In addition, “the default rules of contract law reveal a clear
preference for . . . clear, categorical assignments of risk.”177 Default rules are applicable to
drafting both operational provisions such as performance standards and boilerplate
provisions such as assignment provisions.178 Looking at collective impact case studies,
drafters can learn where “defaults” have occurred and, using such empirical data, draft
default rules that, for example, focus on what type of support the collective impact initiative
is required to offer members in threat of default to prevent default as opposed to only
sanctions for default.179
Moving beyond default rules, a well drafted collective impact agreement will
document “‘shared accountability and differentiated responsibility’ among stakeholders”
where “[e]ach stakeholder ha[s] ‘a defined role in achieving a shared vision of improved
outcomes.’”180 Currently, however, collective impact agreements, if drafted at all, are
drafted as largely aspirational and the agreements are not typically structured to identify
which parties are responsible for what deliverables at any particular phase of the
initiative—an outcome counter to certain fundamentals of contract law.181 “To be clear,
clauses about audit rights, indemnification, limitation of liability, termination for
convenience etc. are not as such in breach of [relational contract and collective impact]
principles.” 182 Relational contracts can and should accommodate standard contract
provisions to help ensure the effectiveness of the contract, “[b]ut the intent and wording
must be fair and balanced, aligning to the guiding principles.” 183
See, e.g., Bryce Johnson, Efficiency Concerns in Breach of Multilateral Contracts, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1513, 1516 (1997).
173 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 104, at 1115-16.
174 Id. at 1092.
175 Scott, supra note 132, at 600.
176 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1546 (2016).
177 Scott, supra note 132, at 606.
178 See id. at 598. (“The principal task of the law of commercial contracts is to set default rules for
commercial actors and other repeat players who, presumably, are quite capable of bargaining for
customized alternatives”).
179 These default rules would have to be more substantive that just offering a “cure period” for curing a
default. See id. at 602–06.
180 See Grossman et al., supra note 144, at 4 (citing Strive Network, Commitment to Quality Benchmarks
for Building Civic Infrastructure, STRIVE NETWORK,
www.strivenetwork.org/sites/default/files/images/Committment%20to%20Quality_0.pdf (last visited
October 2013)).
181 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 712-13 (stating that a contract is “the projection of exchange into the
future”).
182 BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 35.
183 Id.
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In addition to the benefit of efficiency that would come from the uniformity in
collective impact practice with the creation of a written form collective impact agreement,
there are public policy reasons that support this suggestion. Although collective impact
initiatives are generally private law transactions, collective impact initiatives exist to
produce large-scale social change for the public good.184 As such, collective impact
agreements are contracts for the public interest, and the public would be harmed in some
way if a collective impact initiative failed. While this may seem to be limited to
unrecoverable reliance damages, the idea that there could be any potential harm to
underserved communities warrants the use of a written form agreement specifically tailored
to the collective impact framework.185 Resident’s in poor urban communities should not
suffer harm because of an initiative’s failure to execute a well-structured agreement.186
CONCLUSION
As a strategy for combatting urban poverty, impact transaction through relational
contract seeks to address the lack of hope present in Marvin Gaye’s lyrics at the beginning
of this essay. Urban poverty is thriving, and, in many respects, always has. Where past
programs and initiatives have failed, collective impact provides not only frameworks for
written agreement, but, also, fundamentally, a framework for hope.
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